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 Multiculturalism: A Challenge
 to Two Myths of Liberalism
 Shelley M. Park, Philosophy, University of Central Florida
 Michelle A. LaRocque, Philosophy, Independent Scholar
 Working collectively to confront difference, to expand our awareness of sex, race, and class
 as interlocking systems of domination, of the ways we reinforce and perpetuate these
 structures, is the context in which we learn the true meaning of solidarity. It is this work
 that must be the foundation of the feminist movement.
 bell hooks, Talking Back
 If feminism is the academic arm of the political movement for women's
 liberation (Jaggar 1 983), then it must align itself with multiculturalism which is the
 academic arm of the political movement for a truly inclusive democratic society.
 Historically, feminism has had a dual relationship to the development of multicultural
 programs and policies in the academy. In relation to other bodies of knowledge,
 Women's Studies programs have been, and remain, a driving force behind multicul-
 tural and interdisciplinary work. And yet, issues of multiculturalism have also been
 raised within Women's studies programs and feminist scholarship-most notably by
 women of color (for example, see Collins 1 99 1 , DuBois and Ruiz 1 990, hooks 1 984,
 1988, Joseph and Lewis 1981, Lerner 1993, Lorde 1984, Lugones and Spelman
 1983). Given these relationships to issues of pluralism, it is crucial for feminist
 projects within the academy that we have access to a coherent notion of multicultural-
 ism - one that makes clear both what it is and what it is not.
 This paper comprises a mere beginning on this project. In the first part of
 this paper, we sketch a brief account of multiculturalism. This sketch is not intended
 as a complete account of the complexities of multiculturalism. Indeed, it serves merely
 to point out, rather than work out, those complexities. Nonetheless, it provides some
 of the contours of the concept of multiculturalism which serve to distinguish it from
 other positions that have been under attack recently. In the second part of this paper,
 we address two prevalent and diametrically opposed criticisms of multiculturalism,
 arguing that multicultura lism, properly understood, evades both of them. More
This content downloaded from 132.170.219.53 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 19:58:43 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 28
 specifically, we argue that criticisms of multiculturalism as relativistic, on the one
 hand, and as absolutist, on the other, simply mask liberal democratic theory's myth-
 begotten attempt to resolve the tension between the one and the many. Multicultural-
 ism challenges the myths of meritocracy and abstract individualism which underlie
 liberalism and proposes a reconoeptualization of democracy.
 Understanding Multiculturalism
 What is multiculturalism? Despite, or perhaps because of, increasingly
 popular usage, significant unclarity concerning this concept remains. Confusions are
 both revealed and perpetuated by the synonymous use of the terms "multicultural,"
 "cross-cultural," and "culturally diverse." Confusions are further perpetuated by
 conflating descriptive and prescriptive uses of each of these terms.
 Cultural Diversity
 To emphasize cultural diversity is to emphasize group differences. This
 emphasis on difference may be either descriptive or prescriptive: (me might be simply
 highlighting actual demographic trends or, alternatively, one could be advocating
 policy reform. The debates surrounding issues of cultural diversity in the university are
 not factual debates. Few would deny that cultural diversity is a sociological reality
 within the United States. Indeed, it always has been, although the specific racial and
 ethnic composition of the citizenry has shifted (Wiley 1 993). More recently, linguistic,
 racial and ethnic diversity has also become a sociological reality within schools and
 workplaces. While in 1 960 only six percent of college students were people of color
 (and many of these students attended predominantly black institutions), in 1 99 1 twenty
 percent of college students were nonwhite or Hispanic (Menand 1991).
 The contested issue concerning cultural diversity is a normative one. While
 some view cultural differences as valuable , others view cultural differences as
 problematic. Fuchs (1990:70), for example, "fears" that ethnic diversity threatens to
 "create a 'minority majority' that will make Eurocentrism obsolete by the 2 1 st century."
 Those who fear loss of their own cultural dominance and privilege often view cultural
 diversity as a problem to be overcome. Thus, they may, as Fuchs does, advocate
 tightening immigration and hiring policies and restricting college admissions. Others
 may view cultural variety as something to be "tolerated." On university campuses, the
 attitudinal difference revealed by those who promote "respect" or even "appreciation"
 for alternative cultural traditions and values and those who promote "tolerance" for
 cultural diversity is worth noting. Academics who respect and appreciate other
 cultures will advocate university policies aimed at encouraging cultural diversity.
 Academics who merely tolerate diversity will not work to change the status quo within
 a school's population and curriculum.
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 Cross-cultural Understanding
 Unlike the emphasis on cultural diversity, an emphasis on cross-cultural
 understanding highlights the ability and/or desire to negotiate, reconcile or transcend
 our cultural differences (Muskel 1991). Although the notion of cross-cultural
 understanding presupposes cultural differences, the emphasis here is on shared ideas,
 traditions and values. Claims concerning cross-cultural understanding, like claims
 concerning cultural diversity, can be understood as either descriptive or prescriptive
 claims. Here, however, it is more difficult to disentangle the two types of claims and
 thus there is apt to be less factual agreement. Increased incidence of sexual and racial
 harassment and violence on our college campuses - a reflection of larger social trends
 - testifies to a lack of cross-cultural understanding. Yet, there is little agreement
 concerning how prevalent, insurmountable or worrisome these events are. Thus, there
 is also little agreement concerning what, if anything, should be done to negotiate or
 transcend these campus conflicts.
 Incidents of overt and covert racial assaults on blacks, Hispanics and other
 minorities intensified during the 80s on several college campuses (Farrell 1 988). More
 than one hundred campuses reported incidents of racial or ethnic harassment and
 violence in each of 1 988 and 1 989 (Hurtado 1 992). A 1 99 1 survey of 1 28 four-year
 post-secondary institutions revealed that campus tensions are deeper than these
 reported incidents would suggest. Fifty-seven percent of the institutions surveyed
 claimed that intolerance posed problems on their campuses (People for the American
 Way 1991). Such racial and ethnic conflict among college students - allegedly among
 the best-educated and most open-minded population - has persuaded some educators
 to focus on cross-cultural understanding as a major higher education issue (Halcón and
 Reyes 1991). Yet others have criticized this focus, claiming that advocates of
 multiculturalism have exaggerated the extent and severity of the problem. Moreover,
 critics contend that multicultu ralism has been largely responsible for whatever racial
 and ethnic divisiveness exists on college campuses. D'Souza (1991), for example,
 claims that "overt racism is relatively rare at most campuses" and that multicultural
 policies have created an atmosphere of "academic apartheid" (see also Fuchs 1990,
 National Association of Scholars 1 99 1 , Schlesinger 1 99 1 ).
 Multiculturalism
 Those who claim that multiculturalists have encouraged "tribalism" and
 exacerbated racial tensions (as well as those to whom this criticism accurately
 applies), misunderstand the goals of multicultural education. Indeed, they confuse a
 multicultural emphasis with an emphasis on cultural diversity. Seeing diversity and
 unity as mutually exclusive choices, advocates of cultural diversity have assumed that
 the only way to overcome cultural imperialism and hegemony is to deny the possibility
 of cross-cultural generalizations. Likewise seeing diversity and unity as mutually
 incompatible, critics of diversity goals have assumed that the only way to overcome
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 sectarianism and segregation is to deny the significance of cultural differences.
 Multiculturalism properly understood, however, is distinct from both of these
 approaches.
 Multiculturalism is a normative vision of an academic community which
 attempts to synthesize unity and diversity. The multicultural vision is that of a shared
 community that maintains the integrity of the different groups which comprise it. As
 part of this synthesis, multiculturalism argues that the curricular and extra-curricular
 components of an academic community are intertwined. As Grant ( 1 99 1 ) contends,
 multicultural education means that "ALL of education must be multicultural; staffing
 and personnel no less than curriculum; instruction no less than counseling and
 guidance; primary language maintenance no less than the food served to students in
 the school's cafeteria, and the pictures and symbols throughout the building no less
 than the policies and procedures that give direction to the school system." Issues
 surrounding the content of a student's education and the process of learning that takes
 place in the classroom have, until recently, been separated from issues surrounding the
 general atmosphere in which students live, the make-up of the student body, and so on.
 But, clearly, these two components exist within a reciprocal relationship. As feminists
 have also argued, the ideals which govern the pursuit of knowledge cannot be
 abstracted from the conditions under which students and faculty live and learn (Smith
 1987).
 Multiculturalism is part of a tradition which believes that education should
 include moral education. An academic community should (and does, although often
 unintentionally) impart moral as well as intellectual skills (Millem 1994, Sleeter
 1991). More specifically, an academic community should prepare students to be good
 citizens, by instilling in them the values deemed necessary for living in and contribut-
 ing to the larger society. Of course, one cannot prepare students to live in the larger
 society without having some conception of what that larger society is (descriptively)
 like. Nor can one prepare students to contribute to the larger society without having
 some conception of what that society should (prescriptively) be like. A multicultural
 academic community would be one that willingly and enthusiastically prepared its
 students to participate in a pluralistic, democratic society (Renyi 1993, Sigel and
 Hoskin 1991). Just as feminism is the "academic arm of the women's movement"
 (Jaggar 1983), multiculturalism is, thus, the academic arm of the political movement
 for a truly inclusive democratic society.
 There is, however, an inherent instability in a pluralistic democracy deriving
 from a tension between the one and the many. Constant negotiation is needed between
 the values of unity and authority, on the one hand, and diversity and freedom, on the
 other. This tension will, therefore, also be present in academic institutions which
 attempt to honor both sets of values. Multiculturalism, as a means of honoring these
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 values, has been the focus of a variety of hostile responses. Underlying these responses
 is a pair of contradictory accusations which highlight the tension inherent in pluralistic
 democracy.
 Responding to Multiculturalismi critics
 Multiculturalism has become associated with an advocacy of relativism, on
 the one hand, and yet also with a commitment to absolutism, on the other. M-
 ulticulturalists have thus been attacked on the following contradictory grounds: 1)
 advocates of multiculturalism are charged with "lowering standards" and thus
 promoting an (anti) intellectual atmosphere in which "anything goes" (Bloom 1987,
 National Association of Scholars 1 99 1 , Woodward 1 99 1 , Will 1991) ; 2) proponents
 of multiculturalism are, however, also charged with enforcing absolute standards of
 "political correctness" which are intolerant, oppressive and dogmatic (Bush 1991,
 D'Souza 1991, Hentoff 1991, Schlesinger 1991, Woodward 1991). Obviously, at
 least one of these propositions is false. Below we suggest that both are false and that
 the multiculturalist need not be committed to either: multiculturalism is a third position
 distinct from both relativism and absolutism. Indeed, multiculturalism is as distinct
 from both of these theoretical extremes as democracy is distinct from the political
 extremes of anarchy and totalitarianism.
 The fact that this is overlooked can be traced to a limited conception of
 democracy peculiar to liberal theory. Underlying the two accusations leveled against
 multiculturalism, and masking their inconsistency, are two myths of liberalism: 1 ) the
 myth of meritocracy; and 2) the myth of the abstract individual. It is by means of these
 two myths that the liberal (allegedly) resolves the tension between the one and the
 many in a democratic society. These myths work together to justify the authority
 structures of the status quo while allegedly protecting individual freedom.
 Multiculturalism challenges both of these myths and offers an alternative
 vision of how to reconcile the tensions within a pluralistic society. It is because of this
 deeper challenge that multiculturalism is subjected to such contradictory accusations.
 The charge of relativism derives from the myth of meritocracy and the charge of
 absolutism derives from the myth of abstract individualism. Below we argue that each
 of these myths, and hence each of these charges, is false.
 The Myth of Meritocracy
 The myth of meritocracy suggests that political power, economic rewards and
 a variety of other social goods (e.g. college admission) are distributed to individuals
 according to the value of their skills, talents and potential or actual societal contribu-
 tions. The myth of meritocracy provides liberal democracies with a political
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 justification for socio-economic and other inequalities by alleging that differential
 rewards fairly represent differing degrees of worth (e.g. Rawls 1971). The myth of
 meritocracy is a central thread in our North American cultural narrative. Indeed, it is
 so deeply embedded in popular thought that students (and others) asked to justify the
 radically inegalitarian distribution of wealth both within our nation and between first
 and third-world countries may often suggest that impoverished peoples are stupid,
 lazy, or barbaric, i.e. less intellectually and/or morally deserving of (local, national or
 global) resources than their wealthier counterparts. Despite widespread acceptance,
 however, the myth of meritocracy is just that - a myth.
 The claim that social goods are distributed according to criteria of merit in
 our academic, economic and political communities overlooks nepotism, favoritism,
 back-door deals, old-boy networks and simple good luck as factors leading to the
 accumulation of social wealth. The claim that we live in a meritocracy presupposes
 there are equal opportunities for all community members to develop and manifest the
 skills and virtues, or make the contributions, deemed meritorious in our society.
 Without this assumption, it would make no sense to claim that some do and others do
 not "deserve" certain social goods. But, in any racist, sexist, classist (agist, h-
 eterosexist, ablist, etc.) society, opportunities for self-development and social
 contribution are radically unequal. Moreover, the social, economic and educational
 advantages enjoyed by the wealthy, and the disadvantages suffered by the impover-
 ished, will be inherited by subsequent generations (Gilbert and Kahl 1993).
 It is worth noting that even if racism and other forms of discrimination were
 abolished, this problem would remain. As Jaggar (1983) argues, a meritocracy is an
 "inherently unstable social arrangement." Insofar as a meritocracy encourages an
 inegalitarian distribution of social wealth, some will accumulate advantages (including
 non-economic advantages) from which their children will benefit. Thus, while
 meritocracy "presupposes equality of opportunity, its effect is constantly to make
 opportunities unequal" (196).
 Indeed, unfair competition is unavoidable. Even if the social playing field
 could be levelled out, certain "natural" differences may result in unequal opportunities.
 As Ezorsky (1976) points out, some candidates may be better qualified for a position
 than others due to certain biologically inherited traits. (Consider, for example, the
 advantage of height in seeking a basketball scholarship.) As several writers have
 suggested, such cases undermine the notion that a meritocracy is fair by illustrating
 that a distribution of social goods on the basis of skills, talents and achievements does
 not, in fact, and could not, in principle, coincide with distribution according to desert
 (Ezorsky 1976, Fienberg 1973, Rawls 1971).
 Thus, the claim that our liberal democracy is a meritocracy is a myth in two
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 senses. First, it is a false depiction of the principles of distribution which actually
 operate in our society. Second, it is an ideal which is, in principle, impossible to attain.
 Nonetheless, the myth of meritocracy is hard to dislodge- perhaps especially so in its
 application to post-secondary education. The prevalent assumption of most colleges
 and universities is that institutions of higher learning are, and should be, intellectual
 meritocracies. In such (alleged) meritocracies, students are admitted and graded,
 faculty are hired and evaluated and scholarship is published and taught solely on the
 basis of intellectual merit.
 It is because of this prevalent myth surrounding the university - together with
 the assumption that criteria of merit are universally applicable and objectively
 ascertained- that multicultural educators have been charged with lowering or
 abandoning intellectual "standards".
 The Charge of Relativism
 The multiculturalist seeks to increase student access to knowledge by
 admitting a greater variety of students (and faculty) to the university and offering a
 greater variety of courses, materials and pedagogical methods. The opponent of
 multiculturalism seeks to maintain limited access, by retaining traditional restrictions
 on who will be admitted and how and what they will be taught. Tradition alone,
 however, is clearly an insufficient reason to limit educational access. Hence, the
 defender of the status quo adverts to the myth of meritocracy. Thus, the National
 Association of Scholars (1991) expresses "alarm" at multicultural policies which
 "admit students widely disparate in their level of preparation in order to make the
 campus demographically representative.'1 Likewise, they express dismay at
 "preferential hiring for faculty and staff positions determined by race, ethnicity and
 gender" and the presence of "ethnic and gender studies courses [without] genuine
 scholarly content" Such practices and policies, according to the National Association
 of Scholars, involve "the repudiation of appropriate intellectual criteria" (7-9).
 The multiculturalist is thus accused of being a relativist who adopts an
 "anything goes" mentality which is tantamount, at best, to lowering academic standards
 and, at worst, to abandoning academic standards altogether (see also Bloom 1987,
 D'Souza 1991). This charge of relativism operates at both the curricular and the extra-
 curricular level.
 Curricular issues
 At the level of the curriculum, debates concerning multiculturalism take the
 form of academic canon debates. The multiculturalist supports ethnic studies
 programs, women's studies programs and so forth, and advocates integrating the
 questions, concerns, insights and interpretations of minority and feminist scholarship
 into traditional departmental curricula and general education programs. Opponents
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 to such curricular reform claim that such programs and scholarship are less valuable
 than "great works of Western culture" and are, therefore, undeserving of a central
 place in university curricula (D'Souza 1991). The homage paid to the traditional
 canon of great works clearly presupposes the myth of meritocracy. It assumes that the
 philosophical, literary and artistic works of (white, male) western European culture
 that have, until recently, been the sole content of university "core" curricula have
 merited that exclusive status by their clear and unchallenged intellectual profundity.
 Closely aligned with the myth of meritocracy is the myth of objectivity. A
 defense of traditional curricula can only be maintained by presupposing that certain
 authors, issues, viewpoints and styles are included or excluded from the canon on the
 basis of an objective, non-biased and non-arbitrary assessment of their intrinsic worth.
 This is clearly the stance of Adler (1991) who defends his exclusion of most female
 and all black authors from the second edition of Great Books of the Western World
 as follows: "These exclusions were not, and are not, invidious. The difference between
 great and good bodes is one of kind, not of degree. Good books are not 'almost great'
 or 'less than great' books. Great books are relevant to human problems in every
 century, not just germane to current twentieth-century problems. A great book requires
 reading over and over, and has many meanings; a good book need be read no more
 than once, and need have no more than one meaning" (60). Thus, according to Adler,
 while African Americans and women have written some "good" books, their demand
 for inclusion in core curricula is not grounded in "objectively valid truth", but simply
 in a "wish for power or self-esteem" (64). Like Adler, the National Association of
 Scholars (1992) insists that "scholarship must strive to be objective. . . scholarly
 activities and scholarly products [should] be judged . . . solely by universal and
 disinterested criteria of merit without regard to gender, race, ethnicity, sexual
 orientation, religion, political leanings or other personal characteristics of the scholar"
 (1).
 In sum, the charge of relativism levelled against advocates of a multicultural
 curriculum presupposes that curricular decisions can be, traditionally have been, and
 should be, made on the basis of an objective evaluation of a scholar's or cultural
 artifact's intrinsic worth. Yet this is a highly questionable assumption. It can be, and
 has been, questioned on at least two grounds: 1 ) whether such an assessment of the
 merit (or lack of merit) of a work is objective ; 2) whether it makes sense to view a
 canon or curriculum as intrinsically worthwhile.
 Feminist and multicultural scholarship have challenged the presumption of
 objectivity, pointing out that, historically, intellectual work has been valued or
 devalued according to criteria other than merit (Gitlin 1991). Moreover, the notion
 that merit criteria, even when adhered to, are themselves objectively established is
 highly problematic. As Harding (1979) argues: "within a meritocracy, those who
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 performance. Because they have achieved their own favored position by accepting
 prevailing standards of merit, they will not tolerate criticism of those standards. Thus
 a meritocracy will tend inevitably toward conservatism . . . " (219). Finally,
 deconstructive and reading-response methods emerging from literary criticism have
 challenged the very possibility of objectively assessing the value-or meaning- of a
 text, claiming (contra Adler) that all texts have multiple meanings, none of which are
 transcultural or transhistorical (Derrida 1985, Fish 1980, Patterson 1993).
 Similarly, much of the new pedagogy challenges the notion that any canon
 is intrinsically meritorious, claiming that canons should be viewed as heuristic devices
 for exemplifying styles, techniques and issues to students (Castenell and Pinar 1993,
 Nisbet and Schucksmith 1986, Kennedy 1991). As feminist and multicultural
 research has shown, learning styles may differ along gender and ethnic lines (Belenky,
 et al. 1 986, Kolodny 1 99 1 , Ramirez 1 982). New heuristic devices may, therefore, be
 necessary as the composition and needs of the student body change, since a
 pedagogical tool is only useful insofar as it enables our students to learn. Thus, we
 cannot determine the merit of our core curriculum without examining the demographic
 make-up of our student-body. Nor can we determine its merits without examining the
 cultural, political and economic climate which exists outside of the university. This
 broader climate affects not only what incoming students can be expected to know, but
 also suggests what students will need to learn in order to live in and contribute to that
 larger society.
 Extra-curricular issues
 At the extra-curricular level, debates over multiculturalism focus on the
 composition of the student (and faculty) body and typically take the form of debates
 over affirmative action. Here again, the multiculturalist, who supports affirmative
 action policies, is accused by opponents of "lowering standards" to let (allegedly)
 unqualified or less qualified students and faculty into the Academy. According to
 D'Souza ( 1 99 1 ), "universities routinely admit black, Hispanic, and American Indian
 candidates over better-qualified white and Asi an- American applicants" (17-18).
 Here again, the charge levelled against multicultural policies presupposes the
 myth of the meritocracy propped up by the myth of objectivity. The critic of
 multicultural policy assumes that, were it not for affirmative action programs, students
 would be admitted and faculty would be hired at universities on the basis of an
 objective, non-biased and non-arbitrary assessment of their academic excellence.
 Thus, Woodward (1991), for example, criticizes university attempts to achieve a
 student population approximating the racial and ethnic variety found in the larger
 community as "impossible to reconcile with old policies ... of acceptance according
 to merit and achievement ..." (3 1 -32). Hence, the proponent of affirmative action is
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 accused of relativism. But here, again, both the charge and the myths which support
 it are highly suspect.
 The charge of relativism implies that only the 'best' students and faculty got
 into college in the past. But, as Woodward himself admits, the "old policies" of
 acceptance according to merit were "not always faithfully followed" (ibid). The fact
 is that Admissions offices and hiring units use, and have always used, a host of criteria
 in selecting students and teachers. Until the 1 960s, some of the criteria utilized were
 explicitly biased and excluded women and blacks from the University.
 Other criteria, which were and are utilized, are simply arbitrary if viewed as
 indicators of academic merit. Admissions offices may consider the applicant's place
 of residence, alumni connections or athletic prowess, in addition to GPAs and SAT
 scores, in selecting students. Similarly academic hiring units look at a job candidate's
 areas of interest, collegiality and personal connections, in addition to his or her
 teaching experience, publication record and letters of reference, in choosing new
 faculty members.
 Finally, there is reason to doubt that even those criteria which are used as
 objective indicators of academic merit are value neutral. Test scores and publication
 records are limited indicators of intellectual acumen. Moreover, they will inevitably
 reflect the interests, knowledge and values of testmakers and publishers as much as
 they reflect the abilities of the test taker or essay writer.
 In sum, when the critic of multiculturalism accuses the proponent of new
 research and policies of "lowering standards," he invokes the myth of meritocracy.
 This myth obscures the fact that traditional standards are problematic-they function,
 intentionally or unintentionally, to exclude certain groups of people. The proponent of
 multiculturalism seeks neither to abandon, nor to lower academic standards. Instead,
 the multiculturalist seeks to broaden (and diversify) standards which have traditionally
 narrowed the access to knowledge.
 The Myth of Abstract Individualism
 The myth of abstract individualism alleges that human beings are essentially
 isolated atoms whose individual attributes, needs, interests, abilities and desires are
 given prior to, and remain fundamentally unaltered by, concrete social circumstances
 and relationships (Jaggar 1983). This metaphysical assumption is closely connected
 to the myth of meritocracy discussed above. Viewing essential human characteristics
 (such as reason) as properties of individuals which are given independently of any
 particular social context, liberals are led to deny the impact of cultural norms on
 cognitive styles, intellectual interests and personal needs and identities. The myth of
 abstract individualism thus supports the liberal contention that great works of
 literature are those which speak (presumably in the same way and for the same
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 that it is possible to provide objective and fair evaluations of individual academic
 excellence. Admissions committees and hiring units (allegedly) make objective
 appraisals of candidates by using reason untainted by the evaluators' own social
 backgrounds, values or group memberships. And evaluators can make fair assess-
 ments of an individual's academic potential or achievement without considering the
 candidate's social memberships, since ex hypothesis the race, class or gender of that
 candidate has not affected her intellectual aptitude, style or accomplishments.
 In depicting individual humans as isolated from their social and cultural
 contexts, the myth of the abstract individual also depicts individuals as isolated- and
 insulated - from their political contexts. Thus, the thesis of abstract individualism leads
 the liberal to assert that all citizens enjoy equal freedoms, as well as equal
 opportunities-regardless of their relative powerfulness or powerlessness in the
 concrete communities they inhabit.
 Like the myth of meritocracy, the myth of abstract individualism alleges
 something which is both false, in fact, and impossible, in principle. As feminists have
 argued, women and men may exemplify radically different cognitive and emotional
 styles which can be explained by their gender-sensitive socialization (Belenky et. al.
 1986, Gilligan 1982, West 1988). And as anthropologists have argued, individuals
 inhabiting different cultures exhibit significant cognitive diversity (Geertz 1973,
 Whorf 1964). Finally, contemporary western philosophers and psychologists have
 questioned whether the notion of a presocial self with any determinate nature is even
 conceptually coherent. Harre (1984), for example, argues that our "sense of self is
 nothing more than our particular way of organizing perceptions, thoughts, feelings and
 memories to help unify our experience. But our methods of organizing experience are
 publicly given by language and other cultural schema. Thus, the self and its (allegedly)
 internal states-as well as our sense of self as something which transcends culture- are
 ultimately social phenomena. To comprehend a self, its abilities, beliefs and desires,
 we must, therefore, observe the social contexts in which individuals are embedded.
 These phenomena are culture-relative (see also Gergen 1977, Scheman 1983).
 Such challenges to abstract individualism undermine liberal conceptions of
 freedom and equality which are presupposed by recent depictions of multiculturalists
 as infringing on academic freedoms, as we will argue below. Yet, the myth of abstract
 individualism, like the myth of meritocracy, is hard to dislodge as the ongoing hysteria
 over "political correctness" demonstrates.
 The Charge of Absolutism
 In addition to, and closely related to, debates concerning curricular reform
 and affirmative action, are debates concerning university speech and behavior codes
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 and, more generally, the politicization of the academy. On May 4, 1 99 1 , George Bush
 used his commencement address at the University of Michigan to criticize the
 "Orwellian" tactics of "political correctness" at institutions of higher education. Across
 the nation, he warned, universities and colleges were engaging in "censorship":
 "declarfing] certain topics off limits, certain expression off-limits, even certain
 gestures off-limits" (227). "Outraged" at such "bullying", Bush compared political
 correctness to an "inquisition" and urged a return to "reason" and the "freedom to
 speak one's mind".
 The claim that multiculturalism breeds intolerance by imposing restrictive
 standards on individual behavior, like the claim that multiculturalism breeds over-
 tolerance by failing to adhere to restrictive standards of merit, plays itself out at both
 the curricular and extra-curricular levels.
 Curricular issues
 At the level of the curriculum, debates concerning multiculturalism's
 absolutism take the form of academic freedom debates. The multiculturalist, as
 described above, advocates integrating non-western and feminist scholarship into
 traditional university curricula. To facilitate this integration, the multiculturalist
 promotes faculty development workshops, incentives for curricular and pedagogical
 innovation and other institutional policies which recognize, support and encourage
 faculty efforts to make their classrooms and scholarship more inclusive. Adherents of
 traditional curricula, scholarship and pedagogy have charged that such institutional
 support for multicultural work infringes on their academic freedom. Thus, faculty
 opponents of multiculturalism claim that diversity trainers are "propagandists" and that
 those who support such training are "McCarthyites" who attempt to "control what
 would be thought and taught" (Adler 1991, D'Souza 1991, Hentoff 1991, National
 Association of Scholars 1991, Woodward 1991).
 The notion of academic freedom which operates in these debates makes
 sense only if one accepts the myth of abstract individualism. The defender of academic
 freedom assumes that, until recently, university faculty have designed and taught
 courses and chosen research topics and methods, independently of any interpersonal
 influence. The charge of absolutism levelled against advocates of multiculturalism
 presupposes that faculty interests and teaching styles can, have and should emerge
 prior to cultural trends and remain unaltered by institutional values.
 This is a highly implausible assumption. Feminist and multicultural
 scholarship have challenged this assumption of intellectual independence, pointing out
 that, as a matter of historical record, intellectual work has commonly reflected and
 reinforced prevailing (patriarchal, ethnocentric) social values in both its substance and
 style (Castenell and Pinar 1993, Gilligan 1982, Keller 1985, Scheman 1983, Smith
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 1987, West 1988). Moreover, common sense itself would suggest that, contrary to the
 assumptions of abstract individualism, faculty members have always been influenced
 (consciously or unconsciously) by their own teachers and mentors, past and present.
 Not only does the critic of multiculturalism deny such common sense, he
 perverts it to suggest that the lines of influence run in the other direction. Thus,
 various professors have claimed that their rights to academic freedom have been
 violated not only by their peers or superiors, but also by their students. A widely
 circulated example concerns Professor Stephan Thernstrom, a liberal historian at
 Harvard who was, according to D'Souza ( 1 99 1 ), "harangued by student activists" who
 charged him with racism for using slave owners' journals in his introductory history
 course. Students allegedly filed a fermai complaint with the administration concerning
 this (and remarks in lectures concerning black men as wife-beaters) and publicly
 proclaimed Thernstrom a "racist" in the student newspaper, without first talking to
 him. The administration's (perceived) failure to defend Thernstrom against the
 students' charges made Thernstrom "feel like a rape victim" and he subsequently
 decided not to teach the course again.
 This case has taken on mythical proportions as an example of "the attack on
 freedom ... led by minorities" (Woodward 1991). Yet, "almost every element of the
 stay D'Souza tells is erroneous" (Wiener 1 99 1 , 98). According to the three students
 directly involved (black, female and never interviewed by D'Souza), they did speak
 with him privately about their concerns with his perspective, they did not publicly
 charge him with racism, and their goal was to improve - not quash- his course by
 broadening, rather than narrowing the perspectives it offered. (One student requested
 the inclusion of slave narratives alongside-not instead of- slave owners' journals.)
 And according to all accounts, Thernstrom's included, the administration never
 sanctioned Thernstrom and, indeed, wrote him a strong end-of-the year report.
 Moreover, within days of the incident, Harvard's administration issued a freedom of
 speech proclamation which said: "[in] disputes over classroom material . . .
 instructors exercise full discretion over the content of lectures and the conduct of
 classroom discussion" and "in the classroom, our students are entitled to question
 views with which they disagree", concluding that "the University cannot prevent all of
 the conflicts that a commitment to free inquiry may provoke" (quoted in Wiener 1 99 1 ,
 102).
 Although the university's official stance on the issue clearly affirmed
 Thernstrom's academic freedom, D'Souza reports Thernstrom finding their statement
 "equivocal", implying that "he had the right to be a racist, if he wished". Genovese
 (1991) shares this analysis, alleging that university administrators "create[d] an
 atmosphere in which professors who value their reputations . . . learn to censor
 themselves".
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 The notion that faculty self-censorship is an obvious evil makes sense only
 if one accepts the myth of the abstract individual. It embodies a failure to recognize
 that the professor works within a community and, moreover, occupies the role of an
 authority figure within that community. Clearly a teacher's speech and actions do not
 exist in a vacuum- -the professor professes to others and, if he is an effective teacher,
 his words and actions will affect his students. It is imperative, therefore, that an
 instructor recognizes his power over his students and uses that power wisely.
 Along with power comes responsibility. The emphasis, in current debates
 surrounding multiculturalism, on issues of professorial or academic freedom not only
 ignores this, but it also completely obscures relations of power. By viewing
 individuals as pre-existing socio-political relations, the myth of the abstract individual
 gives rise to the myth of abstract equality which alleges that all humans are fundamen-
 tally equal. This myth serves to mask the concretely inegalitarian nature of our social
 relationships including those between faculty and students, men and women, whites
 and blacks, the middle-aged and the young. Only by appealing to the notion of abstract
 individuals with abstract equality can a faculty member plausibly portray himself as
 victimized by his students. Clearly the claim that Thernstrom - a well-respected,
 tenured, Ivy league Professor - could be "raped" by three unknown young black female
 students is ludicrous if examined in light of the actual social positions and relation-
 ships occupied by the respective parties. Why thai, have so many taken this claim (and
 other similar ones) so seriously? To answer this, one must examine how the myth of
 abstract individualism (and abstract equality) intersects with the myth of meritocracy
 (and objectivity).
 By viewing people as isolated from their social and hence political contexts,
 the myth of abstract individualism obscures the fact that some people are better
 situated than others to dominate public (including academic) discourse. Further, it
 ignores the fact that "in any social organization, the views of the dominant tend to be
 taken for granted as objective and neutral. Challenges to these views - like those we
 are now hearing at universities - appear to seek special favors for the 'less qualified',
 or some compromising of academic standards" (Bartlett 1 99 1 , 1 23). Thus feminist and
 multiculturalist requests for the curricular inclusion of authors such as Mary
 Wollestonecraft or Tom Morrison (or student requests for course inclusion of slave
 narratives) are viewed as politically suspect pleadings of special interest groups, while
 the traditional curricular inclusion of Aristotle or Shakespeare (or slave-owners
 journals) typically goes unnoticed and (until three students had the audacity to notice)
 undefended. The presumption of political innocence (and objective merit) accompa-
 nies tradition. But as Bartlett (1991) points out, standard 'Western Civilization'
 courses are not apolitical. "In fact, it is precisely the alignment of these courses with
 particular points of view - the dominant ones in our society- that makes them appear
 neutral" (123-24).
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 Likewise, the insistence by some "girls" and "blacks" that they be called
 "women" or "African- Americans" is often viewed with suspicious irritation, while a
 teacher's request to be addressed as "Doctor" or "Professor" goes unquestioned. While
 all titles and names "convey substantive political messages about power and self-
 definition . . . those that conform to existing lines of authority are taken as neutral signs
 of respect, while those that implicitly encroach upon that authority stand out as
 shamelessly political and arrogant" (Bartlett 1991:124). Faculty, but not students,
 deserve respect according to the rules of an (alleged) academic meritocracy.
 There is, in short, a double standard that operates in discussions critical of
 multiculturalism. In particular, faculty who allege that students are depriving them of
 their academic freedom demonstrate a fundamental lack of respect for the academic
 freedom of their students. Consider Professor Thernstrom's dissatisfaction with
 Harvard's response to student criticism of his course. What did Thernstrom want the
 administration to do, beyond issuing statements affirming his academic freedom?
 When asked this by Wiener (1 991), he replied that Harvard's administration should
 have "declared that Harvard selects its faculty with enormous care and backs with
 great confidence the freedom of its professors to discuss subjects in which they are
 competent"; the administration should have "come out swinging" at his student critics.
 (104). In other words, Thernstrom wanted the university to uphold his authority
 (merit) and not simply his freedom. Students who questioned the legitimacy of his
 views should have been stifled. Harvard's failure, according to Thernstrom, was in
 portraying academic freedom as a right shared by all members of the academic
 community, instead of claiming it the sole privilege of (meritorious) faculty.
 Extra-curricular issues
 At the extra-curricular level, debates over multiculturalism's alleged
 absolutism also take the form of free speech debates. College campuses have
 witnessed in recent years a proliferation of racist speech and behavior outside of the
 classroom, including racist leaflets in dorms, white supremacist orators, effigies of
 lynching victims, "jungle" parties (in which white students paint themselves black and
 place rings in their noses), and even bomb threats at minority student union offices
 (Lawrence 1 990). In an attempt to prompt a return to simple civility, some universities
 have developed campus speech and behavior codes. Opponents of multiculturalism
 often point to these codes governing student speech and conduct as further examples
 of censorship.
 Here again, it needs to be pointed out that universities have always had
 behavior codes (and, for many years, dress and appearance codes as well) that set
 'minimal' standards for community decency. Such codes, whatever their merits, are not
 the invention of multiculturalists. Similarly, restrictions on free speech are not a recent
 invention. Constitutionally protected speech is not, and never has been, absolutely free
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 speech. Slanderous and libelous speech, in addition to speech that offends "community
 standards" are not, nor should they be, constitutionally protected (Chaplinsky v. New
 Hampshire 1942, Miller v California 1973, Levinson 1990).
 An academic community is just that - a community. It is not simply a place
 in which a variety of unconnected individuals can say or do whatever they want.
 (Students cannot plagiarize. Nor can they punch each other.) One's ability to say or do
 something is necessarily constrained by the impact of that speech or behavior on
 community goals and on the ability of other members of the community to work
 toward those shared goals.
 One could only deny the necessity for guidelines governing the speech and
 conduct of individuals by denying the existence of community goals which may
 sometimes take priority over individual rights and freedoms. The myth of abstract
 individualism enables the liberal to do just this. By depicting a community as nothing
 more than a sum of individuals, the liberal reduces community goals to the aggregated
 desires of those individuals. The underlying metaphysics of liberalism (which views
 individuals as prior to groups) leads, thus, to a political theory which prioritizes
 individual rights and liberties over the common good. As Sandel (1984) argues,
 liberalism is committed to a framework which is neutral with respect to ends, and it
 thus prioritizes the right over the good in two senses: "First, individual rights cannot
 be sacrificed for the sake of the general good; and second, the principles of justice that
 specify these rights cannot be premised on any particular vision of the good life"
 (566). On this notion of the place and importance of individual rights, a government
 is never justified in imposing on its citizens a preferred set of values. Hence, the
 university is never justified in restricting individual freedoms (such as the freedom of
 speech) for the sake of furthering institutional goals.
 There are several difficulties with this liberal picture, however. First, its
 portrayal of communities as nothing more than aggregates of loosely connected,
 autonomously choosing individuals is conceptually problematic for reasons alluded to
 above. If our social roles are even partly constitutive of who we are, then we cannot
 conceive of ourselves as wholly detached from our relations with others. Furthermore,
 "if we are partly defined by the communities we inhabit, then we must also be
 implicated in the purposes and ends characteristic of those communities" (Sandel
 1 984:567). The preferences and values of an individual are not defined in isolation
 from the preferences and values of the groups to which that individual belongs.
 Finally, freedoms - to speak, act, and pursue various goals-cannot be
 abstracted from the concrete situations in which those freedoms are exercised.
 Closely related to the myth of abstract individualism are the myths of abstract equality
 and abstract freedom. The former masks the concrete inegalitarian nature of many of
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 our social relationships while the latter obscures the fact that one person's use of their
 freedom may interfere with another person's use of their freedom. When the critic of
 campus speech and behavior codes invokes the myth of the abstract individual, he thus
 obscures the fact that completely unrestricted speech and behavior in an inegalitarian
 society functions to further disempower already marginalized groups of people. A
 majority student's freedom to use racial epithets violates a minority student's freedom
 from racial harassment. It is disabling , not enabling speech and thus restrictions
 governing it are not arbitrary.
 The proponent of multiculturalism neither has, nor seeks, power over other
 members of the community. The multiculturalist simply asks that all members of the
 community be empowered to pursue shared community goals. In the context of the
 academy, the multiculturalist thus requests that all students and faculty be enabled to
 participate in the discovery and construction of knowledge - a shared and co-operative
 project. This requires abandoning the liberal vision of democracy as defined by
 meritocracy and individualism.
 Conclusion
 At the outset of this paper, we said that multiculturalism challenges liberal
 democratic theory's conception of democracy. That challenge, we have argued, takes
 the form of challenging two central, and several ancillary, myths of liberalism.
 Feminism is inevitably implicated in multiculturalism's challenge both by virtue of its
 support for multicultural academic policies and by virtue of the fact that feminist
 scholars have identified many of the myths we have discussed as essentially
 masculinist myths (e.g. Bordo 1987, Gilligan 1982, Keller 1985, West 1988). This
 work is crucial to responding to the current backlash against multiculturalism - a
 backlash that includes, but is not limited to, a backlash against feminism.
 Equally crucial, however, is scholarship and practice aimed at developing a
 new conception of democracy which can replace the myth-begotten liberal conception.
 As Scott (1991 ) contends, the approach to multiculturalism within many universities
 has remained fundamentally structured by the logic of abstract individualism: "The call
 for tolerance of difference is framed in terms of respect for individual characteristics
 and attitudes; group differences are conceived categorically and not relationally, as
 distinct entities rather than interconnected structures or systems . . . psychological
 consulting firms . . . hold diversity workshops teaching that conflict resolution is a
 negotiation between dissatisfied individuals" (218). And so on. The problem,
 according to Lerner (1 993), is that we have an inadequate conceptual framework for
 dealing with differences (238). On the one hand, those who emphasize cross-cultural
 understanding - under the guise of humanism - operate with the model of the "melting
 pot." This model assumes that we can only transcend conflicts and disputes by forging
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 a community identity which ignores individual and group differences. And, on the
 other hand, those who emphasize cultural diversity utilize the model of liberal
 pluralism, according to which our communities are not "melting pots," but "salad
 bowls." While the latter model is an advance over the former in that it assumes a
 "sharing of space by multiple parts which add up to a whole," it is ultimately
 inadequate insofar as it construes difference as categorical and not relational (ibid).
 A conception of democracy adequate to the multicultural vision will need to
 reconceptualize difference in a way that recognizes diversity as a positive and dynamic
 force. In particular, a multicultural model of democracy needs to acknowledge that
 differences may be irreducible (they will not "melt" away); that differences are
 relational, often involving hierarchy and differentials of power that are constantly
 contested; that disagreements are inevitable in multicultural communities; that conflict
 resoluti«! will always be temporary; but that alliance and co-operation is possible and
 desirable even where difference and disagreement exist (Riser 1994, Scott 1991).
 Although much work remains to be done here, recent feminist work provides
 a model for multicultural praxis aimed at establishing a truly inclusive, democratic
 society (Belkhir, et. al. 1994). In challenging the myths of liberalism, feminists have
 come to recognize that they must grapple with difference within their own classrooms
 (Belenky et al 1986, Tobias 1990, Kolodny 1991), organizations (Reagon 1981) and
 scholarship (hooks 1984, 1988). As feminists have come to appreciate, "woman" is
 neither a universal, nor a static term. Being a woman means something different to
 women of different races, classes, ages and so forth. Thus, the meaning of "woman,"
 and the project of feminism, has been - and will continue to be - contested, reworked,
 rejected and refined. This has led to an emphasis on learning, knowing and
 community-building as an ongoing process, driven forward by the dynamic relation-
 ship between the one and the many. As hooks (1984) reminds us, in feminist
 movement (as in any social movement), "there is a need for diversity, disagreement,
 and difference if we are to grow" (64). Solidarity does not require, nor does it benefit
 from, the eradication of difference. Feminist conceptions of, and attempts at,
 intellectual and political coalition-building provide a model for working towards a
 common purpose while maintaining and valuing difference. Thus, the attempt to
 struggle with issues of multiculturalism within the feminist movement may guide us
 in addressing these issues within the academy.
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